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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
398, which holds that the violation is only evidence to be considered with the
rest of the facts, and that the rule is limited to cases in which the ordinance
relates to the alleged negligent act under investigation. Here it was admissible
not as substantive proof of negligence, but as an expression of municipal opinion
that the defendant was negligent and is to be taken into consideration with
all the other facts in the case. See also Riegert v. Tltackery, 212 Pa. 86, where
a charge was approved that if the jury find that a reasonably prudent man
would not have given any warning or erected sheds in accordance with the pro-
visions of the ordinance, then the defendant was not liable notwithstanding
the ordinance. See Bergen v. Morton Amusement Co., 95 Misc. Rep. 647, 159
N. Y. S. 935; Deane v. Stegherr, 160 N. Y. S. 1079 which holds it was some
evidence of negligence; and R. Guthinan Transfer Co. v. McGuire, 234 Ill. 125,
84 N. E. 723; Alexander v. Industrial Board, 281 Ill. 201, 117 N. E. 1010.
For Missouri cases, see Owens v. R. Co. 58 Mo. 386, which holds that negligence
is to be passed upon by the court; Karle v. Kansas City etc. R. Co., 55 Mo. 476,
which holds that the negligence must cause the injury. Also Blyston-Spencer
Co. v. R. Co., 152 Mo. App. 118, 132 S. W. 1175, which holds that driving over
fifteen miles per hour in violation of a statute is negligence per se. But see
also, Schlinshi v. City of St. Joseph, 170 Mo. App. 280, 156 S. W. 823, and Ca-
banne v. St. L. Car Co., 178 Mo. App. 718, 161 S. W. 597, which hold it to be
prima facie negligence. C. H. L. '28.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAwv-RIGHT OF A STATE TO DICTATE TERms OF EMPLOYMENT
OF ITS AGENTS AND EMPLOYEES DOES NOT INTERFERE WITH A CITIZEN'S CON-
STITUTIONAL LIBERTY OF CONTRAcr.-The State of Tennessee passed a statute
prohibiting the teaching in the public schools of the theory of evolution or any
theory denying the story of creation as taught in the Bible and teaching that
man was descended from a lower order of animals. The defendant contended
that the statute took away his liberty of contract. Held, the statute was valid,
as neither the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution nor Article 1,
Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution applied to the state as an employer.
The case of The People v. Crane, 214 N. Y. 154, laid down the doctrine that
where it served a public purpose, it was competent for the legislature to discrim-
inate as to who should be employed by the State. In re Dalton, 61 Kans. 257,
declares that such restrictions are direction from a principal (the State) to its
agent (a municipal corporation) and concerned no one else, and did not violate
constitutional rights in that no one was compelled to bring himself under its
provision by contracting with the State. The State v. Atkins, 64 Kan. 174, held
that the paving of streets by a municipality was an act of the State through its
agent and the State could lay down the terms of the contract. This view was
upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S.
207, 48 L. Ed. 148. Tennessee had previously held in Leeper v. State, 103 Tenn.
500 that the adoption of a uniform series of school text-books was a public pur-
pose which the State had a right to regulate.
Ohio has taken a directly contrary view, and held that the State had no right
to interfere with the contracts of municipalities, and such a restriction would
be discrimination between citizens and therefore unconstitutional. Cleveland
v. Construction Co., 67 Ohio St. 197. This view was also taken by Washington
in Seattle v. Smith, 22 Wash. 327; and by California in Ex parte Kuback, 85 Cal.
274. However, the fact that these two latter cases involved municipal ordi-
nances enacted by a body with granted, limited powers and not a statute of the
legislature may have influenced the courts in those decisions. This was the
ground, at least, on which a city ordinance requiring a union label on all city
printing was overturned in Marshall etc. Co. v. Nashville, 109 Tenn. 495.
A sharp distinction is drawn between these cases in which the State is an
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employer or principal and prescribes the terms of its contract with its employees
and agents, and those statutes in which it attempts to regulate contracts be-
tween private individuals. These latter clearly come within the constitutional
prohibition, and are well illustrated in Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 60 L. Ed. 131.
All the cases holding that such a statute is constitutional point out that some
public purpose must be served by the restriction and that the legislature is the
judge of the wisdom of the restriction. The cases on both sides agree that the
restriction cannot be justified under the police power, as public safety, morality,
or convenience is not involved.
It would seem that Tennessee had but followed a line of authority, which if
not unanimous, is of respectable authority. W. T. '27.
CONTEMPT-POWER OF SENATE TO PUNISH FoR.-This was an appeal by de-
fendant, McGrain, from a judgment of a district court discharging in a habeas
corpus proceeding a witness attached by order of the Senate for refusal to af-
tend and give evidence before a Senate investigating committee. The witness,
Daugherty, had been subpoenaed by a committee appointed to investigate the
department of justice and upon his refusal to appear had been held under pro-
cess of attachment by defendant, a deputy sergeant-at-arms of the Senate;
thence followed the habeas corpus proceeding, its decision, and this appeal.
Held, that the power of inquiry with its incident powers to subpoena and com-
pel the attendance of witnesses is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function and as such is impliedly conferred upon the Senate by the
constitution of the United States which expressly confers the power to legislate
and hence the lower court's order discharging the witness was reversed, Mc-
Grain v. Daugherty, (U. S., 1927) 71 L. Ed. 371.
The power of the Senate or any legislative bodies to punish for contempt is
one which has been regularly exercised for some time. Such a power was
used by the British Parliament and in our colonial legislatures before the
American Revolution; also in both Houses and in most of the state legislatures.
UNIV. OF PENN. LAW REVIEW, Vol. 74, No. 7, p. 691 and No. 8 p. 780. (This
article by Prof. Potts gives a rather extended and very able comment upon the
Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt, both from a historical and
a legal viewpoint.) As to the exercise of this power there is little, if any,
doubt, but as to the legality of such exercise we must look further. English au-
thority on this subject is of little value to us since their use of the writ of
habeas corpus is a great deal more limited than ours in matters pertaining to
action by Parliament. Our state courts, including Missouri, quite generally have
held that the power to legislate carries with it by necessary implication ample
authority to obtain information needed in the rightful exercise of that power
and to employ compulsory power process for that purpose, Burnham v. Morrisey,
14 Gray 226, 239, 74 Am. Dec. 676; Wilckens v. Willet, 40 N. Y. (1 Keyes) 521,
525; State ex rel Rosenheimr v. Frear, 138 Wis. 173, 119 N. W. 894; Lowe v.
Summers, 69 Mo. App. 637, 649, 650. Besides the above state decisions, there
are four outstanding findings of the U. S. Sup. Court on the point involved in
this case. In the first, a plea of justification by the sergeant-at-arms of the
House in an action of trespass against him was held good, the court saying that
the House has power to attach and punish a person other than a member for
contempt of its authority, namely, an attempt to bribe one of its members,
Anderson z. Dunn (1827), 6 Wheat. 204, 5 L. Ed. 242. In the second case, and
one which has proved somewhat of a thorn in the side of proponents of the
power in question, a plea of justification similar to that in the previous case
was held not good, the court saying that the House did not have jurisdiction to
make the particular inquiry and hence had no authority to imprison one Kilbourn,
for refusal to testify at such inquiry; note that the court did not deny the
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